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SORENSON'S RANCH SCHOOL and 
SHAUN SORENSON, 
Appellees, 
v. 
RETA D. ORAM, DIRECTOR, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, 
OFFICE OF LICENSING 
Appellant. 
Case No. 20000993-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT STATE OF UTAH 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 62A-4A-413 DOES NOT 
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FELONS WHO PROVIDE SERVICES TO 
CHILDREN AND THOSE WHO DO NOT. 
In their responsive brief, Sorensons argue that Utah Code 
Ann. section 62A-4a-413 has a two-part test consisting of a 
"reporting" test and a "services" test. They argue that 
subsection (1) is separate and distinct from subsection (2) in 
that the State is required to check the criminal backgrounds of 
several categories of individuals, but that, regardless of the 
type of crime, the individuals screened can never be prohibited 
from employment with a licensed youth program unless they 
actually provide services to children. 
The Sorensons' argument is flawed for several reasons. 
Their argument is contrary to the basic principles of statutory 
construction. This Court is required to harmonize statutes so 
that no provision becomes meaningless or superfluous. Reedeker 
v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 583 (Utah App. 1998); State ex rel. 
A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah App. 1997). As noted in the 
State's opening brief, the statute, as a whole, becomes 
meaningless if the statute is interpreted so that the only 
pertinent criminal background is that of a "services provider" in 
a program. Had the legislature only intended for providers of 
services to be affected, it could clearly have specified that 
intent. It is unreasonable to assume that the legislature would 
require the State to screen the criminal background of every 
employee, in every program, if the State's authority to take 
action is limited to service providers. Instead, the 
legislature required that every individual with a close 
association with a program must be screened and, if an individual 
has a felony conviction, that person is prohibited from further 
association with the program. 
Another flaw in the Sorensons' argument is their claim that 
subsection (2) sets forth "five enumerated services" that a 
felon is prohibited from providing. Subsection (2) sets forth 
the types of programs and individual activities that the Office 
of Licensing is responsible for licensing. Child placing 
services are done either through a program or on an individual 
basis. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-601, et seg. (Supp. 2000) . 
Foster care is provided by individual families. Substitute or 
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institutional care is provided in group homes or institutions. 
A youth program is an entity that provides a myriad of services 
and functions, just as a child placing agency or a group home. 
See Utah Code Ann. section 62A-2-101(20) (Supp. 2000). It is not 
an "enumerated service" as described by Sorensons in their 
argument. The Sorensons attempt to equate the specified services 
provided within a program with the program itself. A youth 
program is not simply a specified service within an entity — it 
is the entity being licensed. Thus, subsection (2)'s reference 
to a youth program is a reference to the entity as a whole, not 
to specified services provided to children within the context of 
the program. 
Furthermore, the legislative intent as to the language 
"provide youth programs" is even clearer in light of the State's 
responsibilities. The Office of Licensing has long been 
responsible for monitoring various aspects of the programs it 
licenses, not just the aspect of services to children. Utah 
Code Ann. section 62A-2-106 requires Licensing to set standards 
for basic health and safety, which includes a variety of 
activities not related to "direct services" to children, such as 
fire and food safety, safety of the physical plant, medical 
standards and procedures, emergency preparedness, etc. It is 
significant to note that the final item on the list of standards 
to be set is for "consumer safety and protection." See Utah Code 
Ann. § 62A-2-106(l) (Supp. 2000). Clearly, the phrase "provide 
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youth programs" refers to the whole program, not simply "direct 
services" to children within the program. 
The Sorensons' interpretation of the statute -- adopted by 
the trial court --is fundamentally flawed because it imports 
language into the statute that does not presently exist, such as 
"direct services to children." Furthermore, the erroneous 
interpretation merges, and thereby renders meaningless, the terms 
"employees" and "providers of care." Finally it fails to 
harmonize the statutory provisions so that the statute makes 
sense as a whole. 
II. RECENT LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS SUPPORT THE STATE'S 
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE. 
The Sorensons argue that certain recent legislative 
amendments support their interpretation of the statute that only 
felons who provide direct services to children are prohibited in 
a licensed program. The Sorensons claim that the 1995 
substitution of "provide" for "employed by" in section 62A-4a-
413(3) supports the argument that provision of services to 
children is the correct meaning of "provide youth programs," 
and that "provide" is actually more restrictive than "employed 
by. " 
However, the amendments actually support the State's 
interpretation in light of what is considered a "program" subject 
to State monitoring and regulation. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-2-
106 (Supp. 2 0 00). When any individual or entity "provides" a 
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youth program, as noted above it is not limited to services to 
the children/consumers. The "provision" of a youth program 
involves the physical aspects of the building in which the 
program exists, as well as food safety, medical and emergency 
preparedness procedures, and, generally, consumer safety and 
protection, id. Thus, "providing" a youth program is a much 
broader concept than "being employed by" a youth program, and the 
recent legislative amendments clarifying that language are 
supportive of the State's interpretation.1 
III. THE STATE'S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE IS 
CONSISTENT WITH STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES. 
In Point III of their responsive brief, Sorensons1 argue 
that the statute is unambiguous and, therefore, the State erred 
1
 As noted in the State's opening brief, members of a 
governing body do not, by definition, provide direct services to 
consumers/children in a program. See Utah Admin. Code, R501-2-3 
(attached as Addendum B). Despite that fact, the legislature 
included members of a governing body as individuals for whom the 
State must complete criminal history screening. Given that such 
individuals were never contemplated as "direct service 
providers," the legislature clearly was concerned about their 
access to children in the programs, as well as their influence 
over the programs as policymakers. Sorensons' statutory 
interpretation is flawed because it suggests that the legislature 
included the requirement to screen the criminal history of 
members of a governing body knowing such screening would never be 
used. Given the scope of the State's monitoring and regulation 
responsibilities, members of governing boards "provide youth 
programs" by setting policy, facilitating training, and ensuring 
compliance with legal requirements. They do not, however, 
provide direct services to children. Sorensons' interpretation 
of the statute would render the governing board members' criminal 
screening meaningless contrary to statutory construction 
principles. 
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in providing this Court with pertinent legislative history. The 
State provided this instructive legislative history to the Court 
because the sole dispute on appeal is the meaning and intent of 
the statute. Given that the parties each claim the statute is 
unambiguous, while asserting contrary interpretations, it is 
entirely appropriate for this Court to review legislative 
history.2 
In Point IV of their brief, Sorensons claim that their 
statutory interpretation does not render the terms "employee" and 
"provider of care" superfluous, as the State asserted in its 
opening brief. (See State's Opening Brief at Point I A., pp. 8-
11). In response to the State's assertion that legislature would 
not have included both "providers of care" and "employees" if 
only one category was relevant, the Sorensons' sole argument is 
that an owner or director might not submit to criminal screening 
if the term "employee" is not included in the list. (Appellees' 
2
 Sorensons also claim that the State Office of Licensing 
has manipulated its policy/rules after this action began in order 
to further its "political agenda." (Appellees' Brf. at 18-19). 
They suggest that Licensing deleted "provide direct services for 
children" and substituted "performs services for a licensee" in 
an attempt to strengthen its argument in the courts. In fact, 
the legislature enacted several new statutes shortly after this 
action began which shed more light on the need for a rule change. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-2-101(13), -120 (1997 and Supp. 1998) 
(new criminal background screening statute added which focuses on 
"persons associated with a licensee" and defining those persons 
as owners, directors, members of the governing body, employees, 
providers of care and volunteers). It is significant to note 
that the legislature focused on the "associations" with the 
licensee, not the direct contact or associations with the 
children in the programs. 
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Br. at 20-21). The flaw in Sorensons' argument is that owners 
and directors are already required to submit to such screening, 
and do not have to be an "employee" or a "provider of care" in 
order to be expected to comply with the requirement. Other than 
that one argument, the Sorensons' cannot answer the question 
raised by their flawed interpretation of the statute, which is: 
if the legislature intended to prohibit only felons who provide 
direct services to children from association with licensed 
programs, then why list both "employees" and "providers of care" 
in the statute? The reason Sorensons1 interpretation cannot 
resolve the question is that the statutory provisions are only in 
harmony when the State's interpretation is adopted.3 Given that 
statutory provisions must be interpreted harmoniously and so that 
no parts are rendered meaningless or superfluous, the trial court 
erred in its statutory interpretation (adopting the Sorensons' 
interpretation) which rendered the use of the separate and 
distinct terms "employees" and "providers of care" meaningless. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, as well as the State's 
arguments contained in its opening brief, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's grant of 
3
 The Sorensons claim in passing that "[bjoth terms were 
necessary because some employees provide services to the children 
. . . but are not 'providers of care.'" This assertion has no 
support in either reality or in the law. 
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summary judgment in favor of Appellees and grant judgment in 
favor of the State based on the correct interpretation of section 
62A-4a-413. 
DATED this day of July, 2 001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CAROL L. C. VERDOIA 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of July, 2001, 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, two true and exact copies 
of the Reply Brief of Appellant State of Utah to the following: 
Dale P. Eyre 
Attorney at Law 
175 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 728 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
(!M^M.C.VMM<^ 
8 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
25 UTAH HUMAN SERVICES CODE 62A-2-108 
(f) one individual who represents substance abuse ser-
vices licensees; and 
(g) three individuals who represent clients or the gen-
eral public. 
(2) (a) Except as required by Subsection (2Kb), as terms of 
current board members expire, the executive director 
shall appoint each new member or reappointed member to 
a four-year term. 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection 
(2)(a), the executive director shall, at the time of appoint-
ment or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to 
ec-iurr *h<it the te.5jng.0f board members are staggered so 
that approximately hair J : „r.j hoard is appof rSea^eV^ 
two years. 
(c) The board shall annually elect a chair from its 
membership. 
(3) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any 
eason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpired 
erm. 
(4) The licensing board shall meet at least quarterly, or 
nore frequently as determined by the director, the chair, or 
;hree or more members of the board. Five members constitute 
a quorum and a vote of the majority of the members present 
ins t i tu tes the action of the board. 
(5) (a) Members shall receive no compensation or benefits 
for their services, but may receive per diem and expenses 
incurred in the performance of the m^mb^r's official 
duties at the rates established by the Division of Finance 
under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(b) Members may decline to receive per diem and 
expenses for their service. 1998 
62A-2-105. Licensing board responsibi l i t ies . 
(1) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Admin-
istrative Rulemaking Act, the licensing board shall review and 
approve rules regarding: 
(a) approving, denying, suspending, and revoking li-
censes for human services licensees and facilities; 
(b) conditional licenses, variances from department 
rule, and exclusions; 
(c) the protection of the basic health and safety of 
clients; and 
(d) licensing of all human services licensees that are 
required to be licensed under this chapter. 
(2) The licensing board shall: 
(a) define information that shall be submitted to the 
department with an application for a license; 
(b) review and approve fees, in accordance with Section 
63-38-3.2. for licenses issued under this chapter; 
(c) represent the community and the human services 
licensees; and 
(d) advise the department as requested, concerning 
enforcement of rules established under this chapter. 1998 
62A-2-106. Office responsibi l i t ies . 
The office shall: 
(1) make rules to establish: 
(a) basic health and safety standards for licensees, 
which shall be limited to the following: 
i i) fire safety; 
(ii) food safety; 
(iii) sanitation; 
(iv) infectious disease control; 
(v) safety of the physical plant; 
(vi) transportation safety; 
(vii) emergency preparedness; 
iviii) the administration of medical standards 
and procedures, consistent with the related pro-
visions of this title; and 
(ix) consumer safety and protection; 
(b) minimum administration and financial re-
quirements for licensees; and 
(c) guidelines for variances from rules established 
under this Subsection (1); 
(2) enforce rules: 
(a) approved by the licensing board; 
(b) in effect on January 1, 1998, that apply to a 
service or program for which a licensee is not under 
contract with a division listed in Section 62A-1-105 to 
provide until rules are established pursuant to Sub-
section (2)(c); and 
(c) established after July 1, 1999, by a 
^oji^vjnakiner board created by Section 62A-1-105 
which: 
(i) shall be limited to: 
(A) the administration and maintenance 
of client and service records; 
(B) staff qualifications; and 
(C) staff to client ratios; and 
(ii) may only apply to a service or program for 
which a licensee is not under contract with a 
division listed in Section 62A-1-105 to provide; 
(3) issue licenses in accordance with this chapter; 
(4) conduct surveys and inspections of licensees and 
facilities in accordance with Section 62A-2-118; 
(5) collect licensure fees; 
(6) provide necessary administrative support to the 
licensing board; 
(7) investigate complaints regarding any licensee or 
facility; 
(8) have access to all records, correspondence, and 
financial data required to be maintained by a licensee or 
facility; 
(9) have authority to interview any client, family mem-
ber of a client, employee, or officer of a human services 
licensee or facility; and 
(10) have authority to revoke, suspend, or extend any 
license issued by the department under this chapter by 
following the procedures and requirements of Title 63. 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 1999 
62A-2-106.1,62A-2-107. Repealed. 1998 
62A-2-108. Licensure requirements — Expiration — 
Renewal . 
(1) Except as provided in Section 62A-2-110, no person, 
agency, firm, corporation, association, or governmental unit, 
acting severally or jointly with any other person, agency, firm, 
corporation, association, or governmental unit, may establish, 
conduct, or maintain a human services program or facility in 
this state without a valid and current license issued by and 
under the authority of the department as provided by this 
chapter and the rules of the licensing board. 
(2) No license issued under this chapter is assignable or 
transferable. 
(3) A current license shall at all times be posted in each 
human services program or facility, in a place that is visible 
and readily accessible to the public. 
(4) (a) Each license issued under this chapter expires at 
midnight 12 months from the date of issuance unless it 
has been: 
(i) previously revoked by the office: or 
(ii) voluntarily returned to the office by the human 
services licensee. 
(b) A license shall be renewed upon application and 
payment of the applicable fee, unless the office finds that 
the licensee or facility has not complied with the provi-
sions of or rules made under this chapter. 
(5) Any licensee or facility which is in operation at the time 
rules are made in accordance with this chapter shall be given 
a reasonable time for compliance as determined by the rule. 
1998 
ADDENDUM B 
R501-2-3. Governance. 
A. The program shall have a governing body which is responsible and has authority over the 
policies, training and monitoring of staff and consumer activities for all phases of the program. 
Their responsibilities shall include the following: 
1. to ensure program policy and procedures compliance, 
2. to ensure continual compliance with relevant local, state and federal requirements, 
3. to notify the Office within 30 days of changes in program administration and purpose, 
according to R501-2-2. 
4. to ensure that the program is fiscally and operationally sound, 
5. to ensure that the program has adequate staffing as identified on the organizational chart, 
6. to ensure that the program has general liability insurance, professional liability insurance 
as appropriate, vehicle insurance for transport of consumers, and fire insurance, and 
7. for programs serving youth, the program director oi designee shall meet with the 
Superintendent or designee of the local school district at the time of initial licensure, and then 
again each year as the programs renews it's license to complete the necessary student forms 
including youth education forms. 
B. The governing body shall be: 
1. a Board of Directors in a non-profit organization; or 
2. commissioners or appointed officials of a governmental unit; or 
3. Board of Directors or individual owner or owners of a for-profit organization, and 
4. for Child Placing Adoption Agencies, a Board of Directors. The Board members shall not 
be owners, employees, or paid consultants of the agency. 
C. The program shall have a list of members of the governing body, indicating name, address 
and term of membership. 
D. The program shall have an organization chart which identifies operating units of the 
program and their inter-relationships. The chart shall define lines of authority and responsibility 
for all program staff. 
E. When the governing body is composed of more than one person, the governing body shall 
establish written by-laws, and shall hold formal meetings at least twice a year, Child Placing 
Agencies must meet at least quarterly, maintain written minutes, which shall be available for 
review by the Office, to include the following: 
<• 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the Lexis-Nexis^ Group All rights reserved 
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1. attendance, 
2. date, 
3. agenda items, and 
4. actions. 
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